Weber & Dahrendorf

15 Pages 3771 Words

implicit assertions to the contrary, because of his numerous statements denying the ability of science to refute any normative position or to help one choose among contending normative orientations (Portis, Weber). Indeed, hardly a scholarly piece is written on Weber, it seems, without the preamble that Weber's views on this subject have been widely misunderstood, with the implication that the scholar at hand intends to finally set the record straight. This essay has more humble ambitions. Although it takes issue in the final section with part of the exhaustive view laid out by Portis, this essay does not purport to put forth yet another definitive interpretation of Weber's views on objectivity. Rather it seeks to shed light on Weber's view of the applicability of objectivity by attempting to answer the overarching question that sits at the foundation of those posed above: Was Weber an advocate of value-free social science? The answer, as will be shown, is both yes and no -- because, this essay will argue, Weber maintained a two-tier approach to value-free social science. On the one hand, he believed that ultimate values could not be justified scientifically, that is, through value-free analysis. Thus, in comparing different religious, political or social systems, one system could not be chosen over another without taking a value or end into consideration; the choice would necessarily be dictated by the analyst's values. On the other hand, Weber believed that once a value, end, purpose, or perspective had been established, then a social scientist could conduct a value-free investigation into the most effective means within a system of bringing about the established end. Similarly, Weber believed that objective comparisons among systems could also be made once a particular end had been established, acknowledged, and agreed upon, a position that allowed Weber to make what he considered objective comparisons among such economic systems as...